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1

Venue in Medical Malpractice Cases, O.C.G.A. § 910-31( c ) (S.B. 3, § 2)
–This provision required the transfer of a case from
the county of residence of one joint tortfeasor to the
county where the tort occurred
–Held to violate Art. VI, Sec. II, Para IV of the
Georgia Constitution which directly addresses venue
in cases involving joint obligors
EHCA Cartersville, LLC v. Turner, 280 Ga. 333
(2006); R.J. Taylor Memorial Hospital, Inc. v.
Beck, 280 Ga. 660 (2006); Woodruff v. Gould,
280 Ga. 757 (2007).
–The proper relief for an erroneous transfer under
this statute is to transfer the case back to the original
forum.
Hospital Authority of Gwinnett County v.
Rapson, 283 Ga. App. 297 (2007).

2

Venue and Forum Non Conveniens, O.C.G.A. § 910-31.1 (S.B. 3 § 2)
–This provision authorizes the transfer of a case filed
in a statutorily appropriate venue to another forum
under the doctrine of forum non conveniens (7
factors)
–Held to be constitutional under authority granted by
Art. VI, Sec. II, Para VIII of the Georgia
Constitution. The key factor appears to be that the
statute gives the court, not a party, the power to
determine proper venue.
EHCA Cartersville, LLC v. Turner, 280 Ga. 333
(2006); R.J. Taylor Memorial Hospital, Inc. v.
Beck, 280 Ga. 660 (2006); Hawthorn Suites Golf
Resorts, LLC v. Feneck, 282 Ga. 554 (2007)
–When a court applies this statute, it must make
findings of fact on the record reflecting an analysis of
the seven factors listed in the statute (Hewett v.
Raytheon Aircraft Co., 273 Ga. App. 242 (2005);
Kennestone Hosp. Inc. v. Lamb, 288 Ga. App. 289
(2007).
The trial court’s ruling is reviewed under an abuse of
discretion standard. R.J. Taylor Memorial Hospital,

Inc. v. Beck, 280 Ga. 660 (2006); Federal Ins. Co. v.
Chicago Ins. Co., 281 Ga. App. 152 (2006).

3

Expert Affidavits, O.C.G.A. § 9-11-9.1 and Its
Interaction with O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67.1 (S.B. 3 § 3)
–The amended § 9-11-9.1 provides that § 24-9-67.1
governs the competence of experts who sign
affidavits that must accompany the filing of a
malpractice suit.
–“It is thus the expert’s qualifications, and not the
defendant doctor’s area of practice, that control the
admissibility of the expert’s testimony.” Abramson
v. Williams, 281 Ga. App. 617 (2006)
–The ordinary standard of review is whether the
affidavit attached to the complaint discloses with
certainty that the plaintiff would not be entitled to
relief. Hewett v. Kalish, 264 Ga. 183 (1994);
Handson v. HCA Health Servs., 264 Ga. 293 (1994)
–However, the standard of review is “abuse of
discretion” if
(a) an evidentiary hearing is conducted
under O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67.1(d). Spacht v.
Troyer, 288 Ga. App. 898 (2007); or
(b) where evidence is evaluated in
connection with a motion for summary

judgment. MCG Health, Inc. v. Barton, 285
Ga. App. 577 (2007).

4

Medical Authorizations, O.C.G.A. § 9-11-9.2 (S.B. 3
§ 4)
–This provision requires a medical malpractice
plaintiff to sign a medical authorization form and file
it with the complaint. The medical form authorizes
the defendant’s attorney to obtain and disclose the
plaintiff’s medical records and to discuss the
plaintiff’s care and treatment with the plaintiff’s
treating physicians.
–In Allen v. Wright, 282 Ga. 9 (2007) the Court held
that this provision is preempted by HIPPA (42 U.S.C.
§ 1320-7(a)(2). The Georgia law conflicted with the
federal law is two respects:
–the Georgia statute did not include a “right to
revoke” the authorization as required by HIPPA;
and
–the Georgia statute did not include a “specific
and meaningful identification of information to
be disclosed” as required by HIPPA

See also, Moreland v. Austin, 2008 Ga. Lexis 864
(November 3, 2008) (HIPPA also precludes ex parte
contact by the defendant doctor’s attorney with the
patient’s prior treating physicians).

5

Offers of Settlement, O.C.G.A. § 9-11-68 (S.B. 3 § 5)
–This gist of this provision is that a plaintiff who fails
to obtain a final judgment of at least 75% of a
defendant’s “offer of settlement” must pay the
defendant’s attorneys fees; and a defendant who
rejects a plaintiff’s “offer of settlement” must pay the
plaintiff’s attorneys fees if the plaintiff obtains a final
judgment that is greater than 125% of the offer.
–this statute has been amended since its 2005
enactment to make the statue more even handed and
to eliminate the most of the poorly drafted portions of
this provision
–a number of trial courts held that this provision was
unconstitutional on a variety of grounds. Muenster v.
Suh, Case No., 03-A-01873-4 (Superior Court of
Gwinnett County, September 22, 2005) (access to the
courts; special legislation; retroactivity); Harris v.
Henna Autoplex, LLC, Case No. 03-SC-1247 (State
Court of Cherokee County, March 21, 2006)
(similar); Dowland v. Fowler Properties Inc., Case
No. 02-SC-1625 (State Court of Cherokee County,
September 15, 2006 (same); Cash v. Cochran, Case
No. 02CV-1747 (Superior Court of Forsyth County,
July 31, 2006) (access to courts and retroactivity).

–The Georgia Supreme Court struck down the statute
on the grounds that it had an unconstitutional
retroactive effect and did not reach the access to
courts or special legislation issues. Fowler
Properties, Inc., v. Dowland, 282 Ga. 76 (2007).
–A voluntary dismissal is not considered a “final
judgment” triggering Rule 68 sanctions. McKesson
Corp. v. Green, 286 Ga. App. 110 (2007).

6

Expressions of Sympathy, O.C.G.A. § 24-3-37.1
(S.B. 3 § 6)
–This provision states that “conduct, statements or
activities constituting....expressions of benevolence,
regret, mistake, error...[etc.] should not be considered
an admission of liability.”
–This provision has been held to exclude from
evidence the statement “it was my fault” that was
made by a doctor before the enactment of S.B. 3.
Airasian v. Shaak, 289 Ga. App. 540 (2008).

7

Expert Witness Rules, O.C.G.A. §24-9-67.1 (S.B. 3 §
7)
–This provision addresses, perhaps inconsistently, the
foundation for expert testimony, imposes new and
specific qualifications for expert witnesses in
professional malpractice actions, and incorporates
Daubert standards for challenging the admissibility of
expert testimony in civil cases.
–Mason v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 283 Ga. 271
(2008).
--The Court held that establishing Daubert
standards for civil but not criminal cases did not
deprive the civil plaintiff of equal protection, due
process or violate the principles of separation of
powers.
–experts can base their opinions on facts and
data that are not admissible, relying on 24-967.1(a) and disregarding the seemingly
conflicting language of 24-9-67.1(b) (1)
–Nathans v. Diamond, 282 Ga. 804 (2007). The
Court held that this statute could be applied
retroactively.

–Numerous lower court decisions applying the
Daubert standards to admit or exclude expert
testimony. E.g., Shiver v. Ga. & Fla. Railnet, Inc.,
287 Ga. App. 828 (2007) (excluding the testimony of
plaintiff’s treating physician regarding causation in a
toxic tort case when that opinion was based on an
incomplete medical history of the plaintiff); Hawkins
v. OB-GYN Assoc., P.A., 290 Ga. App. 892 (2008)
(excluding testimony of plaintiff’s expert on cause of
shoulder injury; opinion was not based on any
scientifically reliable method).
Numerous lower court decisions applying the
professional malpractice expert qualification
sections. E.g. Mays v. Ellis, 283 Ga. App. 195
(2007) (gastroenterologist who had never practiced
surgery is qualified to testify against an OB/GYN in a
case that “involved” surgery, but where the issue of
liability turned on the diagnosis, not the surgery);
Tenent Healthcare Corp. v. Gilbert, 277 Ga. App. 895
(2006) (the relevant time frame in which to evaluate
whether an expert witness satisfies the statutory
standards for qualifications is measured from the date
of tort, not the time of trial).

8

Emergency Room Standard of Care, O.C.G.A. § 51-129.5 (S.B. 3 § 10)
–This provision elevates the plaintiff’s burden of
proof to “clear and convincing evidence” and imposes
a “gross negligence” standard of liability.
–This provision applies only to causes of actions that
accrue after the date of the enactment of S.B. 3.
Willingham v. Hudson, 274 Ga. App. 200 (2005).
–What constitutes clear and convincing evidence of
gross negligence? See Pottinger v. Smith, 293 Ga.
App. 626 (2008) (trial court denied the defendant’s
motion for summary judgment; the Court of Appeals
reversed, stating:
In support of his contention that the record
contains clear and convincing evidence proving
that Pottinger's actions were grossly negligent,
Smith points to medical records showing that
Pottinger failed to recognize a serious leg fracture
shown by the x-rays, and that Pottinger failed to
call an orthopedic surgeon to the emergency
room to consult about his leg injury. Smith also
points to the physician's opinion in his OCGA §
9-11-9.1 expert affidavit that these failures were
below the standard of care and were grossly

negligent. Pottinger, however, points to evidence
that she immediately ordered x-rays on Smith's
injured leg; that the x-rays were read by a
radiologist; that she relied on the radiologist's
finding that the x-rays did not show a serious
fracture, and that, based on this finding, there was
no need for an orthopedic surgeon to consult in
the emergency room about Smith's leg injury. In
Pottinger's opinion, her actions met or exceeded
the standard of care....On the present record, this
is such a plain and indisputable case. Even
assuming there was evidence sufficient to create
a jury issue as to whether Pottinger's actions were
negligent, there is no evidence, and certainly no
clear and convincing evidence, by which a jury
could reasonably conclude that Pottinger failed to
exercise even slight care and was therefore
grossly negligent.
–I expect an equal protection constitutional challenge
to this provision, but I do not know of any cases
addressing that issue.

9

Apparent Agency, O.C.G.A. § 51-2-5.1 (S.B. 3 § 11)
–This provision provides a blue print for hospitals to
avoid liability under the doctrine of apparent agency.
–I am not aware of any reported decisions construing
this provision.

10 Joint and Several Liability/Apportionment of
Liability, O.C.G.A. § 51-12-33 (S.B. 3 § 12)
–This is a complex and awkwardly phrased
amendment of an existing statute. It raises important
issues of statutory construction and, perhaps,
constitutional validity that have yet to be addressed in
reported decisions.
–subsection (a) appears to require that a jury
separately determine percentages of fault and
damages; and then the judge shall reduce the
award to account for the plaintiff’s percentage of
fault. See Turner v. New Horizon’s Community
Service Bd., 287 Ga. App. 329 (2007) (approving
of such a procedure);
–subsection (b) would appear to eliminate the
doctrine of joint and several liability in all cases.
However, my colleague, Michael Wells, has
argued that the precise language used fails to do
so. Specifically, he maintains that the retention
of O.C.G.A. § 51-12-32 authorizing contribution
and the application of traditional principles of
statutory construction yield the conclusion that §
51-12-33 merely clarifies the law as it existed
prior to the enactment of S.B. 3–that joint and
several liability is abolished only when the

plaintiff is at fault. See Michael Wells, Joint
Liability Rules, 39 Georgia Law Advocate 18
(Spring/Summer 2005) (Alumni Magazine);
–subsection ( c ) would appear to authorize the
assignment of percentages of fault to persons or
entities who are not nor could have been named
parties to the suit.
–there are a host of issues yet to be resolved in a
reported decision, including:
–does this provision abolish joint and several
liability in general?
–does this provision authorize juries to assign
percentages of fault to any person or entity the
defendant claims is partially at fault?
–would this include unidentified persons
(e.g., the driver of an alleged swerving car
who drove off without being identified) or
intentional wrongdoers? (E.g.,in a suit
brought against the owner of an apartment
whose negligent security contributed to the
criminal assault of the plaintiff, should a
percentage of fault be assigned to the
criminal?).

–If the answer to the above questions is ‘yes’
as a matter of statutory construction, does
this construction raise constitutional issues?
Cf., Plumb v. The Fourth Judicial District
Court, 927 P.2d 1011 (Mont. 1996) (striking
down Montana statute). See generally,
Nancy Marcus, Phantom Parties and Other
Practical Problems with the Attempted
Abolition of Joint and Several Liability, 60
Ark. L. Rev. 437 (2007).

11 Caps on Non-Economic Damages in Medical
Malpractice Cases, O.C.G.A. § 51-13-1 (S.B. 3 § 13)
–This provision places a statutory limit on recovery
for non-economic damages (broadly defined) in
medical malpractice actions. The cap is $350,000 for
all “medical providers” (e.g., doctors); a second
$350,000 may be recovered against a “medical
facility” (e.g., hospital); and a third $350,000 may be
recovered if there is an additional “medical facility”
held liable.
– This statute was held to violate a variety of Georgia
constitutional provisions in Park v. Wellstar Health
Systems, Inc., Case No. 2007 CV135208 (Fulton
County Superior Court, April 30, 2008). This ruling
was appealed to the Georgia Supreme Court. The
plaintiffs argued that the damage cap violated state
constitutional provisions pertaining to the right to a
jury trial, separation of powers, equal protection, and
special legislation. The case was full briefed and set
for oral argument in November. Four days before
oral argument, the case was settled and the appeal was
dismissed.

